There are several dynamics that come into play when it comes to understanding the risk perception gap between aviation security experts and aircrew and other aviation employees. In our last post, I explained the dynamic between safety and security culture in aviation. Another important dynamic seemingly overlooked by most AVSEC research is the conflict between expert and common employees.
Even amongst aircrews, there is a conflict between pilots and cabin crew as to roles when it comes to onboard security threats. According to research conducted by Williams & Waltrip (2016), both pilots and cabin crew referred to themselves as the “last line of defense” when describing their role in dealing with an onboard security threat. They have found that both pilots and cabin crew downplay each other’s importance in dealing with onboard threats. Cabin crew are generally the ones dealing with passenger security concerns and threats in the cabin, whilst pilots have the ultimate decision-making authority during any security incident. Pettersen & Bjørnskau (2015) discuss how functional roles in aviation can come into conflict when it relates to security. Pilots, cabin crew and aircraft technicians have power within their organisations due to their expertise in their positions. When it comes to security, they argue power is coercive in the form of the imposition of sanctions and not from their role in the aviation organisation.
Whilst aircrew can be considered common employees when it comes to security matters, they nevertheless have important security roles when there is an onboard threat. Neither pilots nor cabin crew are considered security experts, and common sentiment has been that there is a significant difference in risk perception between experts and laypersons. This is yet another dynamic that affects aircrews in their handling of onboard security threats. Experts are often perceived as being able to perform better than non-experts within their field of expertise (Thompson et al. 2004). In most cases the title of expert is given to one by consensus of their peers (Shanteau, 1992), although sometimes that label can be bestowed on someone for merely holding a position rather a measure of the actual knowledge they have on a particular topic (Rowe and Wright 2001).
There has been limited research conducted into how risk assessments differ between layperson and experts in other industries. Flynn et al. (1993) concluded experts and laypersons perceive radioactive waste risks very differently. Kraus, Malmfors & Slovic (1992) indicate there are significant differences in how toxicologists and the general public assess chemical risks. Lazo, Kinnell & Fisher (2000) show how laypersons perceive risks to ecosystems caused by climate change differently than scientists. Gutteling & Kuttschreuter (1999) also demonstrate how the general public perceived the threat from the Y2K or Millennium bug as more serious than computer experts.
In contrast, Rowe and Wright (2001) examined nine previous studies including those just mentioned, and concluded the differences between how laypersons and experts perceive risk may not be as significant as conventional wisdom suggest (Thompson et al. 2004). They argue factors such as age and gender that can affect risk perceptions were not considered in the previous research. Slovic (1999) also indicates that different demographical factors correlate with risk perception, indicating a need for more research into this topic. Wright et al. (2000) also argued there was not a significant difference in risk perception between experts and members of the public when examining hazards in the oil and gas industry. The existing research into how experts perceive risk versus non-experts in other industries is quite dubious.
As it relates to aviation, Thompson et al. (2004) explored the differences in how novice and expert helicopter pilots perceived risk in several non-security related in-flight scenarios. Although this research did not directly involve onboard security threats, it can provide some insight into how experience of an aircrew relates to risk assessment. They argue that dealing with infrequent events such as aviation accidents, weather events and terrorism is something that can only be learned from the results of post-incident investigations. Therefore, as experience increases so should the body of knowledge used to make better risk assessments (Thompson et al. 2004). They also believe this is an area that requires more research, especially when it deals with CRM in highly technical work environments where safety is at risk such as commercial aircraft.
This is just another one of the many dynamics aviation security experts need to be aware of in order to develop an effective risk communication strategy with aircrews and other aviation employees. In the coming weeks, I will discuss some of the other important dynamics you should be aware of.
留言